

**FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE**  
2430 E Street, N.W.  
Washington 25, D.C.

9 December 1948

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[Redacted]  
Chief, Okinawa Bureau  
Foreign Broadcast Information Service  
Headquarters, Ryukyu Command, G-2  
APO 331, c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

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I am writing you at this time to give you some constructive criticism of your performance to date as Chief of the Okinawa Bureau.

Before I offer you criticism, I feel I should say that I am keenly aware of the fact that I told you to write us often and keep us advised of your problems, activities, etc. I also recognize the fact that your operations to date have been pretty much of an exploratory nature and there has been little that you could really sink your teeth in. I also recognize the fact that you are doing your own typing and that there are probably many, many other difficulties which are not apparent to us here in Washington. However, you must appreciate the fact that we are extremely busy here and while we feel it is our first duty to serve our Field Bureaus, we must insist that the Field Bureaus conduct their affairs and present their problems in such a manner as will enable us to solve the problems without requiring time and effort out of proportion to the particular problem or to that required for other Field Bureaus who have similar problems.

The first thing I want to discuss is your correspondence. I should like you to understand that I am always glad to get a personal letter from you containing any amount of material either relevant or irrelevant to FBIS and you may rest assured that I will give the contents of any such letter my personal attention. These personal letters, however, should not contain matters which may have to be referred to or coordinated with other offices of CIA or other agencies of the United States Government. You should realize that this correspondence may have to be referred to several different people or offices who examine it for several different purposes and from several different angles. We do not and cannot operate the Washington

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office on the same informal basis which you have seen at Tokyo and Kauai. This correspondence then should be very carefully prepared and I should like to feel when I receive it that it represents your very best effort. Your correspondence and memoranda to date do not appear to be well thought out and are not particularly well written. They contain too much irrelevant matter, personal and official matters are too frequently intermingled, and after reading them they leave most of us wondering what the problem is, if any, what conclusions you have drawn, what recommendations you want to make, and specifically just what you would like to have the Washington office do. Correspondence with us concerning official matters, particularly those which may have to be coordinated with other offices, should in general be confined to one subject and should follow a general pattern of a brief presentation of the problem, a discussion of the problem, conclusions, and recommendations. It should contain all facts which will enable us to make an intelligent decision and give you the action and support which you seek, but must be as brief and well written as possible consistent with the above.

The second matter is your contact with officials on Okinawa. One of the primary reasons for your selection as Chief of the Okinawa Bureau was my feeling that due to your experience as an Army officer you would have no difficulty in gaining access to people with authority and you would understand Army procedure, organization, etc., thoroughly enough to fit in smoothly with the occupation. I, of course, can only judge from your correspondence, but it appears to me here that you are dealing on a very low level with people who do not have authority to make the decisions which will certainly eventually, if not now, have to be made. Furthermore, these contacts are too informal and do not give us the authority that we will eventually have to have before we can implement any project that requires the expenditure of funds. I liked Colonel Patton, the G-2, personally very much, but I certainly gained an impression that he might be on many occasions talking about things of which he was not sure and concerning which he did not have authority to make final decisions. Before we implement any project which requires the expenditure of funds, we must be sure that our plans have been approved by the Commanding General and, if possible, in writing. We cannot act on informal, verbal agreements or understandings with G-2 or the Executive for G-2. A case in point is this 50 kw. transmitter about which I am not yet sure. Certainly somebody on Okinawa must know exactly what the plan is, if there is a plan. You must recognize that you represent not only FBIS but the Central Intelligence Agency and it is certainly not out of line for you to request an audience with the Chief of Staff and to advise him that the CIA wants an answer to such and such a question. Of course, you

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should proceed with measured diplomacy. You also know as well as I that personalities in the Army setup change frequently and what has been understood and agreed by Colonel Patton might be unacceptable to his successor.

The third problem which I have on my mind is merely an impression that you may be going overboard a bit on your plans for administration and housekeeping without taking into consideration the operational necessities of your station. We do not have unlimited funds and the taxpayer's dollar must be looked out for at all times. I do not want a station on Okinawa top-heavy with housekeepers and administrators. I want the maximum amount of information which may be used for intelligence purposes with a minimum of our money spent for administrative overhead.

The last point I have in mind is that I do not care to raise the standard of living for Orientals who work for us on Okinawa to the American level. Granted that these people will for the most part have to purchase from American commissaries, post exchanges, etc., and it is an entirely different proposition from hiring a Chinese for instance in China, it still is not expected that we provide these people with sufficient funds to live on the same standards to which Americans are accustomed to living. I say this because from your letters I gain a definite impression that the personnel which you contemplate hiring locally will not be hired anywhere near as cheap as I had contemplated. It is my idea that in hiring people locally we should be able to get two or three for the same amount we can get people from the States. If our cost is going to be too great for hiring these people, then we can send people from the States. My own experience is that if the American has the ability, he will turn out two or three or more times as much work as the average Oriental.

I have been very frank in this letter, and I hope that it will be received in the same spirit in which it is written. It is certainly not to be considered an admonition to any extent whatever. I am probably at fault for not having made my feelings on these points crystal clear when you were in Washington. I had assumed that due to our being in the Army together for these past several years that it was not necessary. There may also be some points on which my impressions from distant Washington are not correct. I do think it very important, however, that you understand clearly my feelings on these matters. As I said in the beginning, your problems so far have been exploratory and no harm has been done. I do anticipate shortly that it will be necessary to start discussing these problems with other offices and it is very important that we start now on the right basis.

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Please give all of these matters your immediate attention.

Sincerely,

L. K. White

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